Does the Mass Recall Failure Indicate a Shift in Taiwanese Identity?

On July 26, Taiwanese voters across 24 districts that previously elected Chinese Nationalist Party - Kuomintang (KMT) legislators on January 13, 2024, cast their ballot either ‘for’ or ‘against’ unseating their legislators in a historic mass recall election. The largest recall movement the nation has seen since it transitioned into a democracy over three decades ago. The mass recall was organized by civic society organizations, many of whom were riled by the actions of KMT legislators in recent months that they perceive as benefiting China. They argue that the KMT-led budget slashes are detrimental to Taiwan’s national defense, especially in the face of growing Chinese aggression. 

Apart from its ongoing economic coercion and rising military activities, China also attempted to physically harm Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s sitting vice president, during her March 2024 visit to Prague, as confirmed in June 2025 by Czech military intelligence. However, despite rising Chinese threats over annexing Taiwan being a central theme in the pro-recall rallies, ballots against the recall outnumbered those for in all 24 KMT districts. 

So do the results mean that Taiwanese are now open to being more pro-China? That is hardly the case. Since Taiwan’s first direct presidential elections in 1996, there has been a steady and consistent rise in a distinct Taiwanese identity. According to a widely referenced public opinion poll conducted by National Chengchi University, in 1996 24% of the population exclusively identified as Taiwanese, as opposed to those adopting the dual identity of both Taiwanese and Chinese at 49%. In 2008, despite the KMT regaining the presidency with Ma Ying-jeou, those two statistics reversed order for the first time, with those identifying exclusively as Taiwanese at 49% and dually Taiwanese and Chinese at 43%. 

The gap between the two figures has seen a steady increase, with the latest polling released in June 2025 at 62% for exclusively Taiwanese, and 30% for those identifying dually as Taiwanese and Chinese. This defies the notion that voting for candidates from parties seen to be friendlier to China is equivalent to the vast majority of Taiwanese voters preferring to cozy up to China. In fact, taking a closer look at dynamics of recent domestic issues and the recall process itself, identity was hardly a topic on the minds of voters in the 24 districts during this snap election.

First, the districts up for the recall vote only accounted for less than one-third of Taiwan’s 74 legislative districts. It is also noteworthy to point out that all recall campaigns against the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators have failed. They have either ended in KMT local party resignations, indictments against forged signatures of deceased voters, or simply failed to gather adequate signatures in putting forward a recall vote petition. Therefore, despite the unsuccessful bid to oust the 24 sitting legislators at the ballot box, the speed and efficiency of recall efforts by civil society organizations cannot be discounted. 

The scale of mass mobilization was impressive, resulting in a movement that led to the first mass recall vote in Taiwan’s democratic history. This grew organically out of angst by many first time political volunteers in response to recent actions by certain KMT legislators, ranging from slashing national defense budgets that directly tie to the nation’s ability in deterring a Chinese invasion, visits to China to meet with Chinese Communist Party leadership, and repeated blocking of constitutional court nominees to unprecedented large budget slashes that have disrupted day-to-day government operations. To volunteers of the for-recall campaign, such actions were seen as an existential threat to Taiwan’s hard-won freedoms and democratic system.   

Given the high threshold of recalling sitting legislators in Taiwan, the mass recall campaign was already facing an uphill battle. For a successful recall, it requires at least a quarter of all eligible voters in that district to vote in favor of removing the elected official with total ‘yes’ votes exceeding that of ‘no.’ Taiwan has consistently seen the failure of unseating legislators prior to the end of their terms. It is also interesting to note that from Huang Kuo-chang in 2022 to Freddy Lim in 2017, with the exception of Chen Bo-wei in 2021, all of these recall efforts were initiated by KMT-allied groups. Some analysts have observed that a fair amount of Taiwanese voters believe that the democratic process works through the ballot box when their elected candidate’s term comes to an end. Thus, they expect that the appropriate change should happen in due time after their legislator’s term is up.

Second, the approach taken by the mass recall campaign has come under scrutiny by many long-time political analysts. A key focus of the the pro-recall narratives was centered around framing the KMT as a proxy of China, but by painting a broad brush at all KMT legislators as acting on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, it has further galvanized swing voters who prefer to see a separation of powers between different political parties that serves as checks and balances in the executive and legislative branches. 

Despite the recall petitions being submitted by civic society organizations that are separate from the DPP, the KMT capitalized on this sentiment, framing it as an attempt to grab absolute power by the ruling DPP in regaining control of the legislature. These responding narratives mobilized KMT voters to show up at the ballot box. They viewed the recalls as an existential threat to their party’s survival as it could jeopardize the single branch of government the KMT currently controls. Some analysts have suggested that if the recall campaign had targeted specific highly unpopular candidates that have clearly demonstrated their fondness of China or aggressively hampered specific government policies, it would have been better welcomed by moderate voters unaffiliated with the blue or green base. 

The concept of split ticket voting is also still a common sentiment that prevails among many swing voters. Many believe that given the KMT’s close relationship with China, it is a national security risk to have it run the central government, but continue to trust the KMT in local politics given its half a century of experience in municipal roles and extensive network within a vast range of professions and industries. 

Lastly, speaking to volunteers, including leaders in many of the 24 recall campaigns, many have expressed concern with the lack of enthusiasm among the younger voters in Taiwan. Despite the DPP administration’s strong emphasis on national defense, diversifying Taiwan’s economy from China, and enhancing Taiwan’s global profile, many domestic issues remain unaddressed. Despite naturally growing up with a strong identity distinct from that of China, younger generations put a greater emphasis on everyday kitchen table issues. Rising housing prices and lower average income parity outside of high-tech industries continue to plague them. Whether or not the ruling party can successfully address such concerns and synergize it with new momentum that organically grew from the recall campaigns remains to be seen. 

That success will be in large part a factor of how the ruling party addresses this defeat in the months and years to come. The DPP suffered massive defeats in the 2018 local elections and referendums, only to come back with the largest mandate in Taiwanese presidential politics with over 8 million votes for Tsai Ing-wen’s 2020 reelection bid. What is certain is that the highly partisan nature of the July 26 recall votes is by no means a sign of the majority of Taiwanese populace moving closer to the idea of integration with China. 

This article was previously published on CommoWealth Magazine on August 11 2025.