From Partner to Rival, Europe Redraws Its Lines on China

On March 12, 2025, the European Commission published its 'White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030' – the first of its kind since its 2017 reflection paper on European defence, which came in accompaniment to the Juncker Commission's white paper on the future of Europe. The 2025 paper came at the request of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to the Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, and to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President (HR/VP) of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas, as security concerns within Europe's backyard and beyond seem to be more pressing than ever. Indeed, the language in the introductory paragraphs bemoans the "decades of under-investment" in defence at a time when "the international order is undergoing changes of a magnitude not seen since 1945," urging the need for quick, effective, and harmonised EU-wide collective action. This would come most directly in initiatives to re-arm Europe to address both short- and medium to long-term security challenges globally.

While the purpose of white papers is, generally speaking, to launch a debate with the public and stakeholders as well as to specify and quantify objectives, the directness with which this most recent one addresses perceived threats to European and global security – with bold allusions to and mentions of China at multiple points – is key in understanding, concretely, how EU security perspectives have shifted and where they are directed. From its mention of European economic reliance on China to the discussion on threats that China poses to the Indo-Pacific region as well as global order, the white paper signals a fundamental shift in how the EU views its relationship with Beijing and the urgency with which it aims to address its perceived weaknesses, especially at a time when US trade policies seem to, in certain ways, be bringing Europe and China closer.

Beyond mere policy discussion, the white paper outlines specific and time-sensitive actions with concrete deadlines. It called for EU Member States to activate the National Escape Clause by April's end to unlock defence spending flexibility, urged immediate adoption of the Security and Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument that would provide up to €150 billion in loans for defence investments, and mandated the acceleration of collaborative defence procurement to reach at least 40% of total procurement. These measures, alongside a comprehensive Defence Omnibus Simplification proposal due by June 2025, represent the most ambitious EU-level defence coordination effort in the bloc's history—with potential for profound impacts on EU-China relations, particularly regarding critical infrastructure and strategic dependencies.

The China Trilemma: Partner, Competitor, and Systemic Rival

The classic China trilemma – partner, competitor, and systemic rival – that has long scattered Europe's approach and response to Beijing amid economic and geopolitical concerns, is also at the root of much of the rhetoric of the white paper, which balances concessions of economic utility with the urgency of responding to the threats China poses to Europe and the global order. This was often demonstrated within single sentences such as "China is a key trading partner for the EU, it is increasing defence spending, with a lack of transparency around its military build-up."

The stakes have risen as the United States has shifted its approach to European trade and forced Europe to look to China to fill the economic void that it has left, with the bloc lamenting that "traditional allies and partners, such as the United States, are also changing their focus away from Europe to other regions of the world." What this white paper makes clear is that while Europe may be realising that it cannot be completely de-risking from China at a time like this, it must, from hereon, approach any economic interaction with a much higher regard for security than it has previously.

There are many illustrations of how the 'systemic rival' – meaning an alternative mode of governance to European democracy, among other aspects – plays inextricably into any and every instance where the EU and China may otherwise be partners. For one, the EU is faced with a constant challenge with regard to achieving a single market over a large, diverse territory, while Beijing asserts significantly higher level of control over the Chinese economy. This control is particularly employed in a manner that can advance China’s economic interests through artificial government subsidies that leave it dominant in certain markets or key supply chain areas, which the EU characterises as such: "[the rise of China] is tied up with China's approach to trade, investment, and technology by which it seeks to achieve primacy and in some cases supremacy."

The supremacy that China aims to achieve is a direct challenge to Europe since it finds itself, after years of economic cooperation with China during an era of hyper-globalisation, now dependent upon it in several areas – notably that of critical raw materials.

Critical Infrastructure: Chinese Control of European Ports

The white paper's concerns about Chinese influence over critical infrastructure find perhaps their clearest manifestation in the port sector, where Chinese state-owned enterprises have systematically acquired significant stakes across Europe's maritime gateways. As Transport Commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas recently warned, Europe's ports must now "reconsider security... and examine foreign presence more carefully" – a statement that, while not explicitly naming China, carries unmistakable implications.

Chinese logistics companies currently hold stakes in 33 maritime container terminals across Europe. This extensive network includes presence in some of the continent's most strategically vital ports, including Rotterdam, Hamburg, and Antwerp. The primary players in this expansion are the state-owned giants COSCO Shipping (controlling 10 terminals) and China Merchants Group (9 terminals), along with Hong Kong-based Hutchison Ports (14 terminals). In comparison, only a single European private company – APM Terminals controlled by Denmark's Maersk – holds shares in just seven comparable facilities in China.

What began as purely commercial investments following the 2008 financial crisis have evolved into a strategic security concern. The EU Commission's recent defence white paper specifically references concerns about "stricter rules towards the ownership and control of such critical transport infrastructure," reflecting growing awareness that these ports serve purposes beyond trade.

Of particular concern is the presence of Chinese investors in terminals located near military facilities, such as in Amsterdam, Antwerp-Bruges, Gdynia, Le Havre, Rotterdam, Stockholm, and Valencia. With the North Sea ports in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany playing key roles in military mobility and defence plans for NATO's eastern flank, this proximity could allow Chinese monitoring of NATO troop and equipment movements or even enable acts of sabotage aimed at hindering mobilisation in times of crisis.

Digital Security Concerns: Data Sovereignty in European Ports

Beyond physical control, the cybersecurity dimension presents another layer of risk for critical ports. China has been actively promoting its National Transportation and Logistics Public Information Platform (LOGINK), a port traffic management system that has secured cooperation agreements with seven European ports including Antwerp, Hamburg, and Rotterdam. This system, formally overseen by China's Ministry of Transport, aggregates vast quantities of data about shipping movements, cargo, and logistics chains.

In 2023, Belgian intelligence services raised alarms when they accused CaiNiao, a logistics company owned by Alibaba Group, of conducting espionage via specialised software installed at Liège airport. Such incidents highlight how digital systems in ports could potentially be leveraged for intelligence gathering or competitive advantage.

However, the strategic landscape may be changing. A recent significant development came when Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison announced plans to sell 14 European terminals, including one in Gdynia, Poland, to a US-Swiss-Italian consortium led by BlackRock and MSC (the world's largest shipping company). This divestment, driven partly by pressure from the Trump administration, represents a potential opportunity to enhance Europe's strategic autonomy in critical infrastructure.

The defence white paper's emphasis on protection of critical infrastructure corresponds directly with ongoing EU initiatives to secure ports and maritime assets. In 2022, the EU adopted the Directive on Critical Entities that requires member states to audit infrastructure and enhance resilience. However, implementation at the national level has been inconsistent, with some countries rejecting Chinese bids for port acquisitions while others, like Germany, have approved partial stakes.

The white paper's call for a comprehensive Defense Omnibus Simplification proposal by June 2025 will likely include provisions addressing foreign ownership of critical infrastructure like ports. According to the European Parliamentary Research Service briefing, the white paper is expected to "identify the way forward on 'European projects of common interest'" which would include critical infrastructure protection, and "ensure that excessive dependencies on third countries are reduced."

The Taiwan Question: From Port Security to Semiconductor Supply Chains

European concerns about Chinese control of ports connect directly to an even more strategically consequential flashpoint: Taiwan. The white paper makes several explicit references to Taiwan that signal growing EU alarm over a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait. As the document states, "China is intensifying its political, economic, military, cyber and cognitive measures to coerce Taiwan" – language notably more direct than previous EU policy documents.

This escalation in rhetoric reflects a dawning recognition that port ownership is merely one facet of a broader vulnerability. The paper's warning that "an escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait could cut the EU off from access to key materials, critical technologies and components" draws a straight line between maritime security concerns and the semiconductor supply chains upon which Europe's digital economy depends, especially given the fact that Taiwan dominates advanced chip manufacturing, producing over 90% of the most advanced microchips globally.  Europe, on the other hand, holds only 10% of global semiconductor fabrication capacity, and its highest-valued tech company ASML (a Dutch microchip printing supplier) relies on Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company and Taiwanese customers for 41% of its net sales.  Even as the European Union has launched the EU Chips Act and formed the Semicon Coalition to boost investment and capacity, Europe’s share of advanced chip production remains limited.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has brought to the forefront more than ever the strong interplay between the military and the economic, in particular when it comes to critical supply chains and economic dependencies more generally: for instance, before the invasion, the European Union relied on Russia for about 40% of its natural gas and 27% of its crude oil imports.  Following the invasion, Russia drastically cut gas supplies to Europe, and Western sanctions targeted Russian oil and gas exports. This led to a dramatic spike in energy prices, forced European nations to scramble for alternative suppliers, and triggered a global energy crisis that affected households and industries far beyond the immediate conflict zone.

Conclusion: A New Era in EU-China Relations

Overall, the white paper marks a decisive shift in how the EU approaches its relationship with China. While acknowledging China's continued importance as a trading partner, the document clearly prioritises security considerations over economic expediency in a way unprecedented for Brussels. This reflects the EU's growing recognition that economic dependencies—whether in ports, technology, or raw materials—have profound security implications.

The white paper's concrete action items, from the SAFE instrument to enhanced military mobility initiatives, signal that the EU is moving from rhetoric to action in addressing its vulnerabilities vis-à-vis China. By calling for stricter oversight of foreign ownership in critical infrastructure, increased defence investment, and closer attention to the Taiwan issue, the document represents a confirmation of the urgency and proactivity with which Europe now aims to address its complex relationship with China, but also security at large.

As the EU implements these measures in the months and years ahead, Beijing will likely face a more cohesive and security-conscious European approach—one that continues to seek economic engagement but with significantly more guardrails and scrutiny than in previous decades.

This article was previously published on CommoWealth Magazine on June 13, 2025.